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Abstract. Information flow and non-interference are popular concepts for expressing confidential-
ity and integrity properties. We present the first general definition of probabilistic non-interference
in reactive systems that includes a computational case. This case is essential to cope with real
cryptography, since non-interference properties can usually only be guaranteed if the underlying
cryptographic primitives have not been broken. This might happen, but only with negligible prob-
ability. We show that our non-interference definition is maintained under simulatability, the notion
of secure implementation of modern cryptography. This allows secure composition of systems and
yields a general strategy for including cryptographic primitives in information-flow proofs. As an
example we study a cryptographic firewall guarding two honest users from their environment.
1 Introduction
Information flow and non-interference are powerful concepts for expressing the confidentiality and integrity re-
quirements that a program or a cryptographic protocol should fulfill. The term “absence of information flow”
illustrates the confidentiality view: One requires that no information flows from a secret system part or data item
into a less secure system part or data item, or from users with high confidentiality needs to less trusted users. The
term “non-interference” illustrates the integrity view: One requires that no untrusted information should interfere
with data items with higher correctness needs, or that highly trusted users are not misinformed or bothered by
such information.
The concept of information flow was first investigated for secure operating systems by Bell and LaPadula [26]
and by Denning [35]. Subsequently, various definitions have been proposed that rigorously specify when infor-
mation flow is considered to occur. The first, named non-interference, was introduced by Goguen and Meseguer
[40, 41] to analyze the security of computer systems. Their work was limited to deterministic systems; never-
theless, subsequent work is still based on their ideas. Afterwards, research focused on non-deterministic sys-
tems. The main distinction is between probabilistic and possibilistic behaviors. Beginning with Sutherland [83],
the possibilistic case was treated in [63, 88, 67, 90, 58], while definitions handling probabilistic and information-
theoretic behaviors were proposed by Gray [47, 48] and McLean [65]. Clark et. al. showed in [32] that possibilistic
information-flow analysis can be used to check for probabilistic interference in certain cases.
For reasoning about real cryptographic systems, we need probabilistic behaviors. On this probabilistic side,
Gray’s definition of “Probabilistic Non-Interference” of reactive systems stands out. It is closely related to the
perfect case of our definition, but it does not cover computational aspects, which are essential for reasoning
about systems using real cryptographic primitives. As an example, consider an arbitrary public-key encryption
scheme. Obviously, an adversary with unlimited computing power can break the scheme by computing all possible
encryptions of every plaintext and comparing the results with a given ciphertext. Moreover, even polynomially
bounded adversaries may have a very small, so-called negligible probability of success, e.g., by trying just a few
encryptions of a few plaintexts. Thus, cryptographic definitions usually state that every polynomially bounded
adversary can only achieve its goal with a negligible probability. We present the first general definition of non-
interference for this computational case. Thus, non-interference properties can be expressed for reactive systems
⋆ A more compact version of this paper appeared at ESORICS 2002 [10] and IJIS 2004 [13].
containing arbitrary cryptographic primitives, which is of great importance for extensible systems like applets,
kernel extensions, mobile agents, virtual private networks, etc.
In contrast to other definitions, we do not abstract from cryptographic details and probabilism a priori, e.g., by
using the common Dolev-Yao abstraction [37] or special type systems, but include the computational variant in
our definition. This enables sound reduction proofs with respect to the security definitions of the included cryp-
tographic primitives, such as an underlying public-key encryption scheme. This means that every possibility to
break the non-interference properties of the system can be used to break the underlying cryptography. Moreover,
we show that our definition behaves well under simulatability, which is the common concept in modern cryp-
tography for defining a notion of secure implementation. We show that non-interference properties proved for an
abstract specification automatically carry over to a concrete implementation if that implementation is correct in
the sense of simulatability. This theorem is essential since it enables modular proofs of large systems, i.e., proofs
done for ideal systems not containing any probabilism simply carry over to their real cryptographic counterparts.
Moreover, properties of these ideal systems could quite easily be proved with machine assistance, so our theorem
provides a link between cryptography and formal proof tools for non-interference.
As an example, we present a cryptographic firewall which enables two honest users to communicate with each
other, but guards them from their environment, and prove its desired non-interference property.
Further related literature. An important application of information flow is the static analysis of program code
with respect to certain privacy requirements. This problem was first treated by Denning [36] using flow graphs
on I/O variables. Recently, type-based systems have been proposed [85, 82, 86, 81] for detecting and eliminating
information flow in different kinds of languages. Some of these type systems were proven correct by Sabelfeld
and Sands [78, 79], who presented a semantic characterization of probabilistic bisimulation and used it to express
non-interference for multi-threaded and sequential programs. Formal soundness proofs of security type systems
in general have been pioneered by Volpano et al. [87]. Mantel and Sabelfeld [62] investigated the integration
of security properties of programming languages and abstract-level properties of information flow, providing an
interesting overview of how models of different security properties can be combined to increase the relative power
of their analysis. Moreover, a tool for automatically checking the information flow in concurrent languages has
been developed by Focardi and Gorrieri [38] for a variety of information-flow models.
Today, there is no general definition of the absence of information flow, but several of them coexist. Every
definition has advantages and disadvantages, and which one to take depends on the application area. Many of
these definitions have the shortcoming that they are not preserved under refinement, cf. [65, 51, 60]; moreover,
special care must be taken concerning the composition of secure system when reasoning about comprehensive
security properties such as non-interference, see [63, 52, 64, 66, 68, 61, 34, 23, 5, 20, 7, 21, 14]. Furthermore, many
definitions of non-interference were overly restrictive, so that many useful systems did not fulfill them. This
problem is often tackled by downgrading certain information, so that it may then leak from the system, see
[72, 91]. In some cases, the amount of leaked information can be rigorously defined using information-theoretic
techniques [71, 53].
Some recent research also investigated non-interference properties involving real cryptographic primitives.
Laud [54] presented a sequential language for which he expressed real computational secrecy. Besides our work,
this paper contains the only definition of non-interference including a computational case. However, the definition
is non-reactive, i.e., it does not comprise continuous interaction between users, an adversary, and the system. This
is a severe restriction on the set of security systems that can be handled. Further, encryption is the only primitive
covered there so far, i.e., other important primitives like authentication, pseudo-number generators, etc. are not
considered. Our definition is reactive and comprises arbitrary cryptographic primitives. Volpano [84] investigated
conditions for safely using one-way functions in a programming language, but his underlying definition does not
express non-interference, but the secrecy of a specific secret. Abadi and Blanchet [1] introduced type systems
where asymmetric communication primitives, especially public-key encryption, can be handled, but these primi-
tives are only relative to a Dolev-Yao abstraction [37], i.e., the primitives are idealized so that no computational
non-interference definition is needed. The computational soundness of Dolev-Yao abstraction is currently still
subject to intenstive research, see, e.g., [73, 2, 19, 8, 11, 24, 21, 3, 14, 70, 16, 15, 6].
Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we briefly review the underlying model of asynchronous reactive system. The
original contributions are presented in Sections 3 to 5. In Section 3 we present our definition of non-interference.
This includes extending the underlying model to multiple users. In Section 4 we show that our definition behaves
well under simulatability, i.e., secure implementation does not change the non-interference properties. In Section 5
we present an abstract specification and an implementation of a cryptographic firewall guarding two honest users
from their environment, and we prove that they fulfill our definition of non-interference. We conclude with a
summary of our results and open issues for future research.
2 General System Model for Reactive Systems
In this section we recapitulate the model for probabilistic reactive systems introduced by Pfitzmann and Waidner
in [74, 22]. Several definitions will only be sketched, whereas those that are important for understanding our new
definitions and proofs are given in full detail. All other details can be looked up in the original paper.
In particular, we repeat the scheduling model in full detail because scheduling is important for achieving non-
interference: We cannot let the adversary schedule everything and hence need special schedulers below. Crypto-
graphic asynchronous systems need two specific scheduling aspects compared with other asynchronous system
models: Schedulers are “normal” system machines, so that they schedule with realistic knowledge, and different
channels may be scheduled by different machines, e.g., so that local submachines can be represented.
2.1 General System Model
Systems mainly consist of several interacting machines. Usually we consider real systems containing a set Mˆ of
machines {M1, . . . ,Mn}, one for each user u from a set M = {1, . . . , n}, and ideal systems containing only one
machine {TH}.
Communication between different machines is done via ports. Inspired by the CSP-notation [50], we write
input and output ports as p? and p!, respectively. The input and output ports in a port set P are written in(P) and
out(P), respectively. Connections are defined by naming convention: port p! sends messages to p?. To achieve
asynchronous timing, a message is not immediately delivered to its recipient, but first stored in a special machine
p˜ called a buffer, where it waits to be scheduled. This can be done by the machine with the unique clock-out port
p⊳!. To schedule the i-th message of buffer p˜, it outputs i at p⊳!, see Figure 1. The buffer then delivers the i-th
message and removes it from its internal list. Most buffers are scheduled either by a specific master scheduler or
by the adversary, i.e., one of those has the clock-out port. Ports p! and p?, in contrast to the other four port types
occurring at the buffers, are called simple, and a simple machine has only simple ports and clock-out ports.
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Fig. 1. Naming of ports around a buffer. Later one can often abstract from the buffer and simply regard q! and q? as asyn-
chronously connected.
The precise definition of machines is a variant of probabilistic state-transition machines, similar to probabilis-
tic I/O automata as sketched by Lynch [57]. If a machine is switched, it reads an input tuple at its input ports and
performs its transition function. This yields a new state and an output tuple. A probabilistic transition function
actually describes a finite distribution over the pairs of a new state and an output tuple. Furthermore, each machine
has bounds on the length of considered inputs. This allows time bounds independent of the environment.
Definition 1. (Machines) A machine (for an alphabet Σ) is a tuple
M = (nameM,PortsM, StatesM, δM, lM, IniM,FinM)
of a machine name nameM ∈ Σ+, a finite sequencePortsM of ports, a set StatesM ⊆ Σ∗ of states, a probabilistic
state-transition function δM, a length function lM : StatesM → (N ∪ {∞})|in(PortsM)|, and sets IniM,FinM ⊆
StatesM of initial and final states. Its input set is IM := (Σ∗)|in(PortsM)|; the i-th element of an input tuple
denotes the input at the i-th in-port. Its output set is OM := (Σ∗)|out(PortsM)|. The empty word, ǫ, denotes no in-
or output at a port. δM maps each pair (s, I) ∈ StatesM × IM to a finite distribution over StatesM ×OM.
If s ∈ FinM or I = (ǫ, . . . , ǫ), then δM(s, I) = (s, (ǫ, . . . , ǫ)) deterministically. Inputs are ignored beyond the
length bounds, i.e., δM(s, I) = δM(s, I⌈lM(s)) for all I ∈ IM, where (I⌈lM(s))i := Ii⌈lM(s)i for all i.
In the text, we often write “M” also for nameM. In the following, the initial states of all machines are a security
parameter k ∈ N in unary representation.
We only briefly state here that these machines have a natural realization as probabilistic Turing machines,
which is used to define runtimes [22].
A collection Cˆ of machines is a finite set of machines with pairwise different machine names and disjoint sets
of ports. All machines start with the same security parameter k. Let further ports(Cˆ ) denote the set of all ports of
all machines in Cˆ . The completion [Cˆ ] of a collection Cˆ consists of all machines of Cˆ and the buffers needed for
all the ports in Cˆ . The free ports free(Cˆ ) in a collection are those to which no other port in the collection connects.
A collection Cˆ is closed if its completion [Cˆ ] has no free ports except a special master clock-in port clk⊳?. The
machine with this port is the master scheduler, to which control returns as a default.
For a closed collection, a probability space of runs (sometimes called traces or executions) is defined. The
machines switch sequentially, i.e., there is exactly one active machine M at any time, called the current scheduler.
If this machine has clock-out ports, it can select the next message to be scheduled as explained above. If that
message exists, it is delivered by the buffer and the recipient is the next active machine. If M tries to schedule
multiple messages, only one is taken. If it schedules none or the message does not exist, the master scheduler is
activated.
Formally, runs are sequences of steps defined as follows (where the state-transition function of buffers is as
explained above).
Definition 2. (Runs) Given a closed collection Cˆ with master scheduler X and a security parameter k, the proba-
bility space of runs is defined inductively by the following algorithm. It has variables r for the run under construc-
tion and MCS for the current scheduler, and treats each port as a variable over Σ∗. Here r is an initially empty list,
MCS a machine name initialized with X, and all port variables are initially ǫ except for clk⊳? := 1. Probabilistic
choices only occur in Phase 1.
1. Switch current scheduler: Switch machineMCS, i.e., set (s′, O)← δMCS(s, I) for its current state s and in-port
values I . Then assign ǫ to all in-ports of MCS.
2. Termination: If X is in a final state, the run stops.
3. Buffer new messages: For each simple out-port q! of MCS, switch buffer q˜ with input q↔? := q!, cf. Figure 1.
Then assign ǫ to all these ports q! and q↔?.
4. Clean up scheduling: If at least one clock out-port of MCS has a value 6= ǫ, let q⊳! denote the first such port
and assign ǫ to the others. Otherwise let clk⊳? := 1 and MCS := X and go back to Phase 1.
5. Deliver scheduled message: Switch buffer q˜ with input q⊳? := q⊳! (see Figure 1), set q? := q↔! and then
assign ǫ to all ports of q˜ and to q⊳!. Let MCS := M′ for the unique machine M′ with q? ∈ ports(M′). Go back
to Phase 1.
Whenever a machine (this may be a buffer) with name nameM is switched from (s, I) to (s′, O), we append a
step (nameM, s, I ′, s′, O) to the run r for I ′ := I⌈lM(s), except if s is final or I ′ = (ǫ, . . . , ǫ). This gives a family
of random variables
runCˆ = (runCˆ ,k)k∈N.
For a number l ∈ N, the l-step prefix of a run r is the list of the first l steps.
Next we define what a machine (e.g., an untrusted user in a non-interference definition) sees in a run and what
events happen at a set of ports, and the probabilities of such views and events.
Definition 3. (Views and Restrictions to Ports) The view of a set of machines Mˆ in a run r is the subsequence of
all steps (nameM, s, I, s′, O) where nameM is the name of a machine M ∈ Mˆ . The restriction r⌈S of a run to a
set S of ports is a sequence derived as follows: First only retain the inputs and outputs, (I, O), from each step,
and further restrict I and O to the ports in S . Then delete pairs where both I and O have become empty.
The corresponding families of random variables (in the probability space over the runs) are denoted by
view Cˆ (Mˆ ) = (view Cˆ ,k(Mˆ ))k∈N and
runCˆ ⌈S= (runCˆ ,k⌈S )k∈N.
With an additional index l, we denote the l(k)-step prefixes of the views and restrictions.
For a one-element set Mˆ = {H} we write view Cˆ (H) for view Cˆ ({H}).
2.2 Security-specific System Model
For security purposes, we have to define how adversaries and honest users connect to specified machines of a
collection. First, an adversary may take over parts of the initially intended machines. These machines are then
absorbed into the adversary, and the remaining machines form a structure. Formally, a structure is a collection
of machines in which one additionally distinguishes at which free ports honest users can connect and expect
some reasonable service (e.g., message transport in a cryptographic firewall), and which ports are only used by
adversaries. The former are the specified ports in the following definition. A valid honest user should neither try
to connect to the remaining free ports of a structure, nor, for unique naming, have ports that already occur inside
the structure. This is expressed by forbidden ports.
Depending on which machines the adversary has taken control of, we obtain different structures, and we call
the set of all structures a system. Typically, a system is defined by means of a so-called intended structure and a
trust model. The intended structure represents a benign world where each machine behaves as specified, and the
trust model is then used to designate the potential sets of machines which are considered to be under control of the
adversary. An example of the typical derivation of these structures from an intended structure and a trust model
occurs in Section 5.
The ports connecting to a given port set P are expressed by the complement notation Pc, e.g., q!c = q↔?,
q⊳!c = q⊳?, q↔!c = q? in Figure 1, and vice versa.
Definition 4. (Structures and Systems)
a) A structure is a pair (Mˆ , S ) where Mˆ is a collection of simple machines called correct machines, and S ⊆
free([Mˆ ]) is called specified ports.
b) If Mˆ is clear from the context, let S¯ := free([Mˆ ]) \ S . We call forb(Mˆ , S ) := ports(Mˆ ) ∪ S¯ c the forbidden
ports.
c) A system Sys is a set of structures. It is polynomial-time iff all machines in all its collections Mˆ are
polynomial-time.
A structure is completed to a configuration by adding machines H and A, modeling the joint honest users and
the adversary. As explained above, H does not have certain ports. A connects to the remaining free ports of the
structure. Both machines can interact, e.g., in order to model chosen-message attacks.
Definition 5. (Configurations)
a) A configuration of a system Sys is a tuple conf = (Mˆ , S ,H,A) where (Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sys is a structure, H is a
simple machine without forbidden ports, i.e., ports(H) ∩ forb(Mˆ , S ) = ∅, and Cˆ := Mˆ ∪ {H,A} is a closed
collection.
For simplicity, we often write runconf and view conf (Mˆ ) instead of runCˆ and view Cˆ (Mˆ )
b) The set of configurations is written Conf(Sys). The subset of configurations with polynomial-time user H and
adversary A is called Confpoly(Sys). The index poly is omitted if it is clear from the context.
3 Expressing Non-Interference
In this section we define non-interference for reactive systems as introduced in Section 2. Information flow proper-
ties consist of two components: a flow policy and a definition of information flow. Flow policies specify restrictions
on the information flow within a system. They presuppose the existence of security domains S, between which
information flow is either permitted or forbidden. Roughly, our flow policies are graphs with the users as nodes.
In the definition of information flow, we want to express that there is no information flow from a user HH to a
user HL iff the view of HL does not allow to distinguish (perfectly or computationally) any behaviors of HH .
L H
Fig. 2. A Typical Flow-Policy Graph Consisting of High and Low Users.
3.1 Multi-Party Configurations
In Definition 5, all honest users were modeled by a single machine H. For expressing non-interference between
two users based on their individual views, we must model different users as different user machines. Hence we
first define multi-party configurations. The only difference to normal configurations is that we have a set U of
user machines instead of the joint machine H.
Definition 6. (Multi-Party Configurations) A multi-party configuration of a system Sys is a tuple (Mˆ , S ,U ,A)
where (Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sys is a structure, U is a set of machines called users without forbidden ports, i.e., ports(U ) ∩
forb(Mˆ , S ) = ∅, and the completion Cˆ := [Mˆ ∪U ∪{A}] is a closed collection. The set of these configurations is
denoted by Confmp(Sys), those with polynomial-time users and a polynomial-time adversary by Confmppoly(Sys).
We omit the indices mp and poly if they are clear from the context.
Runs and views are automatically defined for multi-party configurations because they are defined for all closed
collections, here Cˆ .
3.2 Flow Policies
We start by defining flow policy graphs independent of our model.
Definition 7. (General Flow Policy) A general flow policy is a graph F = (S,❀) with a non-empty set S and
❀ ⊆ S × S. We use infix notation, i.e., we write s1 ❀ s2 for (s1, s2) ∈ ❀, and s1 6❀ s2 for the negation. We
demand s❀ s for all s ∈ S.
A general flow policy is transitive if the relation❀ is transitive.
Intuitively, s1 ❀ s2 means that information may flow from s1 to s2, and s1 6❀ s2 means that it must not.
Transitivity means that whenever indirect flow is possible from s1 to s2 via some other elements, direct flow from
s1 to s2 is also permitted. In this paper, we only consider transitive flow policies.
Example 1. The set S often has only two elements S = {L,H}, called low and high users. The typical flow
policy for this case is that information flow from high to low users is forbidden, i.e., H 6❀ L, while L ❀ L,
L❀ H , and H ❀ H ; see Figure 2.
This definition is quite general since it uses an arbitrary set S. We now refine it to our model of reactive systems.
The intuition is to define a graph on the users and the adversary. However, a definition over the machine set
U ∪ {A} would depend on internal details of the user and adversary machines. Instead, we designate each user
by the set of specified ports it connects to, and the adversary, who connects to the remaining free ports of each
structure, by a symbol adv.
Thus our flow policies only depend on the specified ports of the structures of a system Sys .
Definition 8. (Flow Policy) A flow policy for a port set S is a general flow policy (∆,❀) where ∆ = Γ ∪ {adv}
and Γ = {Si | i ∈ I} is a partition of S for a finite index set I.
A flow policy for a system Sys is a mappingF that assigns each structure (Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sys a flow policyF(Mˆ ,S)
for the set S of specified ports. We require that F(Mˆ ,S) only depends on S , and also write FS .
Note that the adversary is explicitly included in the flow policy. This will be essential to capture that, e.g., the
adversary does not learn any information from an honest user.
Some abbreviations will be useful.
Definition 9. (Additional Flow-Policy Notation) Given a flow policy F for a system Sys , we write ∆(Mˆ ,S),
❀(Mˆ ,S), Γ(Mˆ ,S), and I(Mˆ ,S) for the components of the flow policiesF(Mˆ ,S), and similarly∆S etc. If the structure
or at least S is clear from the context, we even just write ∆ etc.
We assume without loss of generality that adv 6∈ I for every occurring index set I and always define Iadv :=
I ∪ {adv}. Given a structure (Mˆ , S ), we further write Sadv := S¯ and sometimes identify adv with Sadv. Then the
node set ∆ of a flow policy F(Mˆ ,S) is identified with a partition of free([Mˆ ]) with index set Iadv.
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Fig. 3. Sketch of our Non-Interference Definition: HL tries to guess a bit that HH tries to transfer.
Given a structure (Mˆ , S ) and a flow policy (∆,❀) for S , the relation SH 6❀ SL for two port sets SH , SL ∈ ∆
intuitively means that no information must flow from the user machines connected to SH to the user machines
connected to SL in any configuration of this structure. With the identification we made, this also holds for the
adversary, who is connected to the port set Sadv = S¯ .
3.3 Definition of Non-Interference
We now define the semantics of the non-interference relation 6❀. Usually, expressing this semantics is the most
difficult part of an information-flow definition. Given our underlying model, it is a bit easier because we already
have definitions of runs, views, and indistinguishability. We first present the intuitive idea of the semantics and
give the formal definition afterwards.
Figure 3 contains a sketch of our definition of non-interference between two users HH and HL; one of them
may be the adversary. Intuitively, HH should not be able to transfer a bit, or even part of one, to the user HL.
This is modeled as follows. At the start of the run, a bit b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen at random and input to HH . Perfect
non-interference means that HH should not be able to change the view of HL at all, so HL should be unable to
output the bit b with a probability better than 12 . For statistical non-interference, we allow HL a small advantage in
guessing the bit b, modeled by a class SMALL of small functions in the security parameter k. For computational
non-interference, we only consider polynomial-time configurations, and the advantage should be negligible; this
is a special class of small functions. The approach of guessing a bit is essential to extend the notion of non-
interference to the computational case. It is a fundamental concept in cryptography, so our definition serves as a
link between prior work in non-interference and security definitions of real cryptographic primitives.
Formally, to close the configurations, we add machines BITH and OUTL that produce and consume the bit,
respectively. They do this at ports pbit! and p∗bit? connected to special ports of HH and HL.
The configurations with these bit machines will be called non-interference configurations. Another charac-
teristic of non-interference configurations is that the different user machines and the adversary have no direct
connections, because otherwise they could trivially transmit the bit. Moreover, these configurations contain a
master scheduler Xn in. It mainly schedules the users. Where correct machines schedule each other is fixed in
the structures, and which inputs to correct machines are scheduled by the adversary must be taken as given after
the trust model. However, some way is needed to transfer control between different user (and adversary) groups
even if they cannot interfere with each other. Here the master scheduler is needed. Our specific master scheduler
essentially performs round-robin scheduling of users, when users get the control in the configuration at all, but
lets the users choose certain subsequent system inputs.1
The ports where the users get these master scheduling signals are called masteri?. For the master scheduler to
get control once a user was scheduled (to prevent loops among a small user group and some correct machines), the
users have no clock-out ports. Each port p⊳! that a user Hi would have according to its set Si of specified ports is
taken over by the master scheduler. Instead, Hi gets an output ps! to the master scheduler. When it is Hi’s turn, the
master scheduler reads there whether Hi wants to schedule p˜ next. This is shown in Figure 4 for a port p⊳! ∈ S cH .
1 Instead of considering round-robin scheduling only, it is probably also sufficient for most applications to consider schedulers
with the following two properties: They are polynomially fair [17], i.e., they ensure that each user is always scheduled after
a fixed polynomial number of steps, and their scheduling cannot be affected by previous inputs from the users and the
adversary so that it is not possible to transmit information by interfering with the scheduler.
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Fig. 4. Main Parts of a Non-Interference Configuration. The ports of the master scheduler Xn in and the two emphasized users
HH and HL are sketched.
Definition 10. (Non-Interference Configuration) Let a system Sys be given and a structure (Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sys. Let ∆
be a permitted node set for a flow policy for S with index set I, and let H,L ∈ Iadv with H 6= L. Let conf =
(Mˆ , S ,U n in,A) be a multi-party configuration with U n in = U ∪{BITH ,OUTL,Xn in} and U = {Hi | i ∈ I},
and let Hadv := A. We call it a non-interference configuration for ∆, H , and L if the following holds.
a) Ports of Special Machines: The ports of BITH are {masterBITH ?, pbit!, pbit⊳!}. The machine OUTL has only
one port p∗bit?. The master scheduler Xn in has the following ports:
– {clk⊳?}: The master clock-in port.
– {masteri !,masteri⊳! | i ∈ Iadv ∪ {BITH}}: The ports for fair scheduling of the users, the adversary and
BITH .
– {p⊳! | p⊳! ∈ S c} ∪ {p∗bit
⊳!}: The clock-out ports that the honest users would have had.
– {ps?, ps⊳! | p⊳! ∈ S c} ∪ {ps∗bit?, p
s∗
bit
⊳
!}: The ports for receiving scheduling proposals from the users for
the previous set of ports.2
b) Ports of Normal Users: The ports of Hi with i ∈ I \ {H,L} are {masteri?} ∪ (S ci \ {p⊳! | p⊳! ∈ S ci }) ∪
{ps! | p⊳! ∈ S ci }, as explained above. Additionally, HH has a port pbit?, and HL has ports p∗bit! and ps
∗
bit!.
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c) Behavior of BITH and OUTL: If BITH receives an input at masterBITH ?, it chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} at
random, outputs b at pbit!, and schedules it by outputting 1 at pbit⊳!. The machine OUTL does nothing on
inputs at p∗bit?. (It just “catches” the inputs to close the collection.)
d) Behavior of Xn in: The machine Xn in maintains two flags start and sched demand over {0, 1}, initialized
with 0, and a counter cnt over the index set Iadv, initialized with adv. Without loss of generality we as-
sume I := {1, . . . , n} and adv := 0, so the counter is defined over {0, . . . , n}. Additionally, to allow for
polynomial-time versions of Xn in, it has a counter steps and a bound P . (Formally this gives a family of
master schedulers Xn inP , one for each polynomial P and for P = ∞.) If Xn in is scheduled, it behaves as
follows:
Case 1: Start of the run. If start = 0: Set start := 1 and output 1 at masterBITH ! and at masterBITH ⊳!.
Case 2: Schedule users. If start = 1 and sched demand = 0, increment steps if cnt = n and stop forever
if steps ≥ P (k). Set cnt := cnt + 1 mod (n + 1) and output 1 at mastercnt ! and mastercnt⊳!. If cnt 6= 0,
i.e., the clocked machine is an honest user, additionally set sched demand := 1 to handle the scheduling
demands of this user next.
Case 3: Handle scheduling demands. If start = 1 and sched demand = 1, output 1 at every port ps⊳! with
p⊳! ∈ S ccnt , and for cnt = L also at ps∗L bit
⊳
!. Then test whether there was a non-empty input i at exactly one
port ps?.4 If yes, output i at p⊳!, i.e., follow the user’s proposal. In both cases set sched demand := 0.
2 We assume without loss of generality that there is a systematic naming scheme for such new ports that does not clash with
prior names.
3 The adversary always closes the collection; hence if H = adv or L = adv this also holds for Hadv = A. The adversary
always has the ports {masteri?} ∪ S¯ c.
4 More formally, Xn in first sends 1 at the first of these ports. The buffer either delivers a message to Xn in or does nothing. In
both cases Xn in is scheduled again, so it can send 1 at the second clock-out port, etc. It stores all received messages in an
internal array.
We denote the set of non-interference configurations of a structure (Mˆ , S ) for given ∆, H , and L by
Confn in∆,H,L(Mˆ , S ) and the subset of polynomial-time ones by Conf
n in
∆,H,L,poly(Mˆ , S ). All non-interference con-
figurations of a system Sys are written Confn in(Sys) and Confn inpoly (Sys), respectively.
Now we can define the probability that the low user correctly guesses the bit that the high user tries to transmit.
Definition 11. (Guessing Probability) For a non-interference configuration conf ∈ Confn in∆,H,L(Mˆ , S ) of a struc-
ture (Mˆ , S ), the guessing probability Pguess,conf is defined as
Pguess,conf := P (b = b
∗ | r ← runconf ,k; b := r⌈pbit!; b
∗ := r⌈p∗
bit
?).
This is a function of the security parameter k.
Several times we need notions that functions are small, e.g., the advantage of the guessing probability over one
half. Hence we define corresponding function classes.
Definition 12. (Small functions)
a) The class NEGL of negligible functions contains all functions s : N → R≥0 that decrease faster than the
inverse of every polynomial, i.e., for all positive polynomials Q ∃n0 ∀n > n0 : s(n) < 1Q(n) .
b) A set SMALL of functions N → R≥0 is a class of small functions if it is closed under addition, and with a
function g also contains every function g′ ≤ g. Typical classes of small functions are EXPSMALL, which
contains all functions bounded by Q(k) · 2−k for a polynomial Q, and the larger class NEGL.
Now we are ready to give the non-interference definition, i.e., the definition of the semantics of a flow policy for
a reactive system.
Definition 13. (Non-Interference) Let a system Sys , a structure (Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sys , and a flow policy F = (∆,❀)
with index set I for (Mˆ , S ) be given. For two elements H,L ∈ Iadv with SH 6❀ SL, we say that (Mˆ , S ) fulfills
the non-interference requirement NIReqF ,H,L
a) perfectly, written (Mˆ , S ) |=perf NIReqF ,H,L, iff for every non-interference configuration conf ∈
Confn in∆,H,L(Mˆ , S ) we have
Pguess,conf ≤
1
2
.
b) statistically for a class SMALL of small functions, written (Mˆ , S ) |=SMALL NIReqF ,H,L, iff for every non-
interference configuration conf ∈ Confn in∆,H,L(Mˆ , S ) there exists a function s ∈ SMALL such that
Pguess,conf ≤
1
2
+ s(k).
c) computationally, written (Mˆ , S ) |=poly NIReqF ,H,L, iff for every polynomial-time non-interference config-
uration conf ∈ Confn in∆,H,L,poly(Mˆ , S ) there exists a function s ∈ NEGL such that
Pguess,conf ≤
1
2
+ s(k).
We write “|=” if we want to treat all cases together. If a structure fulfills all non-interference requirements
NIReqF ,H,L with SH 6❀ SL for a flow policy F , we say it fulfills the requirement NIReqF , written (Mˆ , S )
|= NIReqF . A system Sys fulfills a flow policy F for this system if every structure (Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sys fulfills the
requirement NIReqF(Mˆ ,S) . We then write Sys |= F .
4 Preservation of Non-Interference under Simulatability
The cryptographic variety of the notion that one system securely implements another one is based on the concept
of reactive simulatability [74]. Reactive simulatability essentially means that whatever might happen to an honest
user of a concrete system Sys real can also happen to this user with a given ideal system Sys id. More precisely,
for every configuration conf 1 ∈ Conf(Sys real), there exists a configuration conf 2 ∈ Conf(Sys id) that yields an
indistinguishable view for the same user. We abbreviate this by Sys real ≥sec Sys id and say that Sys real is at least
as secure as the system Sys id. A typical situation is shown in Figure 5.
The notion of reactive simulatability serves as the culmination of a long line of research done on (non-reactive)
simulatability: Simulatability was first sketched for secure multi-party function evaluation, i.e., for the computa-
tion of one output tuple from one tuple of secret inputs from each participant in [89] and defined (with different
degrees of generality and rigorosity) in [44, 45, 25, 69, 29]. The idea of simulatability was subsequently also used
for specific reactive problems, e.g., [39, 27, 55, 56, 31], without a detailed or general definition. In a similar way
it was used for the construction of generic solutions for large classes of reactive problems [44, 42, 49] (usually
yielding inefficient solutions and assuming that all parties take part in all subprotocols). The first fully reactive
definition of simulatability was presented in [73] for a synchronous version of a general reactive model, and has
been extended to an asynchronous setting in [74] and later but independently in [30].
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Fig. 5. Example of simulatability. For every user H of the real structure and every adversary A1, there must exist an adversary
A1 on a corresponding ideal structure such that the view of H is indistinguishable.
We do not want to compare a structure (Mˆ1, S1) ∈ Sys real with arbitrary structures of Sys id, but only with
certain “suitable” ones. This is specified by a mapping f from Sys real to the powerset of Sys id. The mapping f
is called valid if f(Mˆ1, S1) is non-empty and only contains structures (Mˆ2, S2) with S2 = S1, i.e., with the same
user interface, for all (Mˆ1, S1) ∈ Sys real.
The simulatability definition is based on the indistinguishability of views. Indistinguishability is a notion
defined for arbitrary random variables.
Definition 14. (Indistinguishability) Two families (vark)k∈N and (var′k)k∈N of random variables (or probability
distributions) on common domains Dk are
a) perfectly indistinguishable (“=”) if for each k, the two distributions vark and var′k are identical.
b) statistically indistinguishable (“≈SMALL”) for a class SMALL of small functions if the distributions are
discrete and their statistical distances
∆stat(vark, var
′
k) :=
1
2
∑
d∈Dk
|P (vark = d)− P (var
′
k = d)| ∈ SMALL
(as a function of k).
c) computationally indistinguishable (“≈poly”) if for every algorithm Dis (the distinguisher) that is probabilistic
polynomial-time in its first input,
|P (Dis(1k, vark) = 1)− P (Dis(1
k, var′k) = 1)| ∈ NEGL.
Intuitively, given the security parameter and an element chosen according to either vark or var′k, Dis tries to
guess which distribution the element came from.
We write ≈ if we want to treat all three cases together.
We are now ready to present the reactive simulatability definition, i.e., a notion of cryptographically secure
implementation.
Definition 15. (Reactive Simulatability) Let systems Sys1 and Sys2 with a valid mapping f be given.
a) We say Sys1 ≥f,perfsec Sys2 (perfectly at least as secure as) if for every configuration conf 1 = (Mˆ1, S ,
H,A1) ∈ Conf(Sys1), there exists a configuration conf 2 = (Mˆ2, S ,H,A2) ∈ Conf(Sys2) with (Mˆ2, S ) ∈
f(Mˆ1, S ) (and the same H) such that
view conf 1(H) = view conf 2(H).
b) We say Sys1 ≥f,SMALLsec Sys2 (statistically at least as secure as) for a class SMALL of small functions if
the same as in a) holds with view conf 1,l(H) ≈SMALL view conf 2,l(H) for all polynomials l, i.e., statistical
indistinguishability of all families of l-step prefixes of the views.
c) We say Sys1 ≥f,polysec Sys2 (computationally at least as secure as) if the same as in a) holds with configurations
from Confpoly(Sys1) and Confpoly(Sys2) and computational indistinguishability of the families of views.
In all cases, we call conf 2 an indistinguishable configuration for conf 1. Where the difference between the types
of security is irrelevant, we simply write≥fsec, and we omit the indices f and sec if they are clear from the context.
Below we want to prove that non-interference properties are preserved under reactive simulatability. As flow
policies are defined per system, we first have to define how a flow policy from one system, typically a specification,
is applied to another system, typically an implementation. We do this based on a valid mapping between the
system, i.e., based on the information which real structures implement which ideal structures. As valid mappings
retain the specified ports (the user interfaces) and our flow policies for systems depend only on these specified
ports, this is a canonical transformation.
Definition 16. (Corresponding Flow Policies) Let systems Sys1 and Sys2 with a valid mapping f be given,
and a flow policy F (2) for Sys2. The corresponding flow policy F (1) for Sys1 is defined as follows: For every
(Mˆ1, S ) ∈ Sys1, let F
(1)
(Mˆ1,S)
:= F
(2)
(Mˆ2,S)
for an arbitrary structure (Mˆ2, S ) ∈ f(Mˆ1, S ).
This is well-defined because f(Mˆ1, S ) is non-empty and only contains structures with the same set S , and
F
(2)
(Mˆ2,S)
is equal for all these structures. Further, everyF (1)
(Mˆ1,S)
is a valid flow policy for S by definition. We often
call such corresponding flow policies F on both systems.
Our following preservation theorem states that non-interference properties are preserved under the reactive
simulatability relation ≥sec, as the name “at least as secure as” suggests.
Theorem 1. (Preservation of Non-Interference) Let a system Sys1 be as secure as Sys2, i.e., Sys1 ≥f Sys2 for
a valid mapping f . Let Sys2 fulfill a flow policy F , i.e., Sys2 |= F , and let F also denote the corresponding
flow policy for Sys1 according to Definition 16. Then also Sys1 |= F . This holds for the perfect, statistical, and
computational case.
Proof. We have to show that every structure (Mˆ1, S ) ∈ Sys1 fulfills its flow policy F(Mˆ1,S). We fix such a
structure (Mˆ1, S ) ∈ Sys1 and its flow policy FS = (∆, 6❀) with index set I. For all H,L ∈ Iadv with SH 6❀ SL
we have to show that (Mˆ1, S ) fulfills the non-interference requirement NIReqFS ,H,L.
Let a non-interference configuration conf 1 = (Mˆ1, S ,U n in,A1) ∈ Conf
n in
∆,H,L(Mˆ1, S ) be given. Because of
Sys1 ≥
f Sys2 there exists a configuration conf 2 = (Mˆ2, S ,U n in,A2) ∈ Conf(Sys2) with (Mˆ2, S ) ∈ f(Mˆ1, S )
and view conf 1(U
n in) ≈ view conf H,L,2(U
n in). As the user set U n in is equal in both configurations, conf 2 is
also a non-interference configuration in Confn in∆,H,L(Mˆ2, S ). By precondition, (Mˆ2, S ) fulfills NIReqFS ,H,L.
Now we distinguish the perfect, statistical, and the computational case (for the reactive simulatability type and
the non-interference type together). In the computational case, both configurations are polynomial-time.
In the perfect case, we have viewconf 1(U
n in) = view conf 2(U
n in). Both b := r⌈pbit! and b∗ := r⌈p∗bit? are
part of the view of U n in, so we obtain Pguess,conf 1 = Pguess,conf 2 ≤
1
2 . With our arbitrary choice of conf 1 this
implies that (Mˆ1, S ) also fulfills NIReqFS ,H,L.
In the statistical and the computational case we have a given class SMALL of small functions, where
SMALL = NEGL in the computational case. We assume for contradiction that Pguess,conf 1 =
1
2 + ns(k) for
a function ns 6∈ SMALL, whereas we know that s(k) := Pguess,conf 2 −
1
2 ∈ SMALL.
We then define a distinguisher D as follows. Given the view of U n in in one of the configurations, D knows
both the bit b and the guess b∗. It outputs 1 if b = b∗ and 0 otherwise. Its advantage in distinguishing the configu-
rations by this is
δD := |P (D(1
k, view conf 1,k(U
n in)) = 1)
−P (D(1k, view conf 2,k(U
n in)) = 1)|
= |
1
2
+ ns(k)− (
1
2
+ s(k))| = ns(k)− s(k)
6∈ SMALL.
The last line holds because SMALL is closed under addition. For the polynomial case, this immediately contra-
dicts the indistinguishability of the views, view conf 1(U
n in) ≈poly view conf 2(U
n in).
For the statistical case, the results of the distinguisher D are a function on the random variables of the views.
As the results are Boolean, their statistical distance is easily computed as
δstat,D := ∆stat(D(1
k, view conf 1,k(U
n in)),D(1k, view conf 2,k(U
n in)))
=
1
2
(2δD) = δD.
By a well-known lemma, the statistical distance between a function of two random variables is at most the statis-
tical distance of the original random variables; a proof can be found in [43]. This implies
δview := ∆stat(view conf 1,k(U
n in), view conf 2,k(U
n in))
≥ δstat,D = δD
6∈ SMALL.
The last line holds because SMALL is closed under making functions smaller. This contradicts the statistical
indistinguishability of the views, view conf 1(U
n in) ≈SMALL view conf 2(U
n in).
With our arbitrary choice of conf 1 this implies that (Mˆ1, S ) also fulfills NIReqFS ,H,L in the computational
and statistical case. This finishes the proof.
5 A Cryptographic Firewall
We now present a cryptographic firewall as an example of a system that must fulfill a non-interference property and
uses cryptographic primitives. The goal is to allow communication between certain participants, while ensuring
that these participants cannot be affected by their environment. This goal corresponds to a flow policy. Most
firewalls distinguish users mainly by IP addresses. For high security, however, different external users should
rather be distinguished by cryptographic authentication.
5.1 Introduction to the Cryptographic Firewall
We build the firewall systems in two layers. The lower layer provides secure message transmission, the higher layer
the filtering function. In particular, the secure message-transmission layer provides cryptographic authentication,
so that the filtering layer can filter by name.
For the lower layer, we would like to reuse the secure message-transmission system with ordered channels
from [9]. Ordered channels are one step beyond a related system with unordered channels from [74] towards non-
interference. However, we have to go slightly further, because an adversary could also interfere with the protected
users by scheduling all their messages either immediately or never, which gives different views. Recall that the
explicit master scheduler only ensures that each user can send messages from time to time, while the adversary
still schedules the network. Hence we need a new type of reliable, non-authenticated channels.
For simplicity, we only define and prove one particular information flow policy and corresponding filtering
rule set. The policy is sketched in Figure 6: Two users a and b should be able to communicate, but should not be
disturbed by the other users and the adversary. As this is an integrity view of information flow, it makes a and b
the low users, and all others the high users. As usual, the users are represented in the flow policies by the sets Si
of specified ports they connect to.
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Fig. 6. Sketch of the flow policy for the firewall. The port sets of the protected users a and b, an outsider H , and the adversary
are shown. Missing edges in the graph are of the form “❀”.
We start the detailed description with a review of how systems are commonly derived from an intended struc-
ture with a trust model, and of the composition theorem needed to prove a two-layer system in a modular way
(Section 5.2). In Section 5.3 we present the specification of the lower layer, i.e., an ideal system for secure and
reliable message transmission. In Section 5.4, we define the higher layer, the filtering system. As it is built on the
ideal lower layer and uses no additional cryptography, we need not distinguish a real and ideal version here.
In Section 5.5, we sketch the real lower-layer system and define the new reliable channel type. We also sketch
why the security proof from [9] still applies to the modified secure message-transmission system. Finally, in
Section 5.6 we prove that the two-layer firewall fulfills its non-interference requirement. We mainly do this for the
combination – a well-defined notion introduced in [74] – of the ideal lower layer and the filtering system, and use
our theorems to show that the result also applies to the fully real firewall system.
5.2 Preliminaries
The lower layer of the firewall system is of a class called standard cryptographic systems in [74]. In the intended
structure of such a system, users are numbered 1, . . . , n. Every user u has one machine Mu, which is correct if and
only if the user is honest. The machineMu has ports inu? and outu ! for connecting to its user. A real system Sysreal
is derived from such an intended structure by a trust model consisting of an access structure ACC and a channel
model χ. An access structure ACC is a set of subsets H of {1, . . . , n}. Intuitively, it denotes the possible sets of
honest users, and thus of correct machines. The channel model classifies every connection as secure (private and
authentic), authenticated or insecure. For achieving non-interference with the firewall, we need a fourth channel
type called reliable non-authenticated.
The resulting system contains one structure for every set H ∈ ACC, consisting of the remaining correct
machines from the intended structure with modified channels according to the channel model. For the three
predefined channel types, this modification is a well-defined port renaming scheme [74]. The corresponding
scheme for the new channel type is given in Definition 17. We denote such a set of remaining modified ma-
chines by MˆH := {Mu,H | u ∈ H}, and the remaining set of specified ports by SH. Thus the resulting sys-
tem is of the form Sys real = {(MˆH, SH) | H ∈ ACC}. A corresponding standard ideal system is of the form
Sys id = {({THH}, SH) | H ∈ ACC} with the same sets SH. The machines THH are called trusted hosts.
As we construct the firewall system as a composition of two layers, we briefly review the composition theorem
of [74]. It states that the relation “at least as secure as” is consistent with such compositions. Assume we have
already proven that a system Sys0 is at least as secure as a specification Sys ′0, and we build a system Sys1 on top of
the specification Sys ′0. Then we want to replace Sys
′
0 by the real system Sys0. We call the former, partially abstract
composition Sys∗ and the latter, real composition Sys#. The composition theorem states that this replacement is
secure, i.e., Sys# is at least as secure as Sys∗; see [74] for the precise theorem and its proof. This is illustrated in
Figure 7.
5.3 Lower Layer: Ideal System for Secure and Reliable Message Transmission
In this section, we present the specification of the lower layer of the firewall, secure and reliable message trans-
mission. We first sketch the original ideal system from [9], more precisely its perfectly ordered variant where
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Fig. 7. Composition of Systems
no gaps in the message sequence are accepted. Then we describe the modifications needed to include reliable
communication between the protected users. The resulting ideal system is defined in detail in Appendix A.
Sketch of the original system. The secure message-transmission system with ordered channels from [9] is a
standard cryptographic system as described in Section 5.2, and its access structureACC contains all subsets of the
user indices {1, . . . , n}. Thus the ideal system is of the form Sys ′0,orig = {({THH}, SH)|H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}.
The ideal machine THH models initialization and sending and receiving of messages. Initialization corre-
sponds to key generation and authenticated key exchange in real system. Besides the specified ports, THH has
ports to advu ! and from advu? where it informs the adversary, and accepts adversary inputs, regarding the service
to user u. This is necessary because in efficient implementations, the adversary gets certain information and has
certain influence, in particular by network scheduling.
A user u initializes communication with other users by inputting a command (snd init) at the port inu? of
THH. To reflect the asynchronous timing model, THH waits for a command (rec init, u) from the adversary at a
port from advv? before regarding communication between u and v as initialized.
A user u sends a message to user v by inputting (send,m, v). If v is dishonest, THH immediately outputs
(send,m, v) to the adversary. If v is honest, THH stores the message in an array deliver specu,v together with a
counter that indicates the number of messages sent from u to v, and outputs (send blindly, i, l, v) to the adversary,
where l and i denote the length of m and its position in the array, respectively. This models that the adversary
learns that a message of a certain length is being sent.
For delivering this message to v, the machine THH waits for a command (receive blindly, u, i) from the
adversary at a port from advv?. Then THH reads (m, j) := deliver specu,v [i] and checks whether msg out specu,v = j
holds for the number msg out specu,v of the next expected message.
If yes, it outputs (receive, u,m) to v and sets the expected number to j + 1. This last condition ensures that
messages can only be delivered in the order as they were input to THH.
The adversary can send a message m to a user u by inputting (receive, v,m) at the port from advu? of THH
for a corrupted user v; this message is output to u immediately.
The adversary can also stop the service for user u by inputting (stop) at port from advu?. This models that an
adversary may achieve that the runtime bound of u’s machine is exceeded in the real system.
Note that this ideal system is completely deterministic and without cryptography.
Adding reliable message transmission. We want to build a firewall by adding a filtering policy on top of this
ideal message-transmission system, and the firewall should fulfill the flow policy shown in Figure 6. However, as
long as the adversary can schedule the messages between the protected users a and b (recall that THH waits for a
command (receive blindly, b, i) for that, where without loss of generality we always consider a as the sender), it
can achieve two distinguishable behaviors by either immediately scheduling each such message, or never schedul-
ing them. This problem cannot be solved by the filtering system on top.5 This corresponds to a small covert chan-
nel. To close it, we need to specify reliable communication for the two protected users a and b in this section, and
later define suitable implementations of reliable channels in the real system.
The modified trusted host for the modified system Sys ′0, still called THH, behaves identically for inputs from
and outputs to users u 6∈ {a, b}. For communication from a to b, it is modified as follows (and vice versa):
– If a inputs an initialization command (snd init) at ina?, THH immediately initializes communication with b.
In particular, it outputs (rec init, a) to Hb and schedules this output.
5 The filter at user b can only delete messages from other senders, but has to let messages from user a pass, while it cannot
let them pass if they do not arrive.
– If a sends a message to b, i.e., inputs (send,m, b) at ina? then THH immediately outputs (receive,m, a) at
port outb ! and schedules it.
In both cases, THH informs the adversary of the event as above. The complete resulting definition of the ideal
system Sys ′0 is given in Appendix A.
5.4 The Filtering System
We now present the filtering system, the upper layer of the firewall. It is called Sys1 as in Figure 7. We only
need filters for the protected users a and b, and filtering only works if the machines of these users are correct,
i.e., a, b ∈ H. Hence the system has only one structure, which contains only two machines Mfiltera and Mfilterb . The
composition of these filtering machines with the secure message-transmission system is shown in Figure 8 with
individual user machines Hu, but without the special machines of the non-interference configurations and that
Xn in takes over the clock-in ports.
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Fig. 8. Firewall system consisting of filtering machines and the specification of secure reliable message transmission. Clock-out
ports are omitted; every machine has the corresponding clock-out port for each of its output ports.
The inputs and outputs to the filters from above and below are as in the message transmission system, because
the goal is to filter such messages. Recall that even the ideal secure message-transmission system with reliable
channels allows the adversary to stop the service to a user at any time, modeling that an adversary overpowers
a correct machine in the real system. If an adversary either stops the service to user a at the start of the run,
or never stops it, we obtain different views for the user a. To avoid this problem, we provide additional reliable
channels pMa and pMb to close a covert channel based on stopping a service. The reliable channels pMa and pMb
are only used if the underlying service for secure message transmission has been stopped, and they should hence
only be regarded as a remedy against denial-of-service attacks. In the real world, this means that if the commonly
used communication method falls prey to a denial-of-service attack, the users will look for an alternative way to
communicate.
Scheme 1 (Filtering System) Let n ∈ N, a, b ∈ M := {1, . . . , n} with a 6= b, and polynomials L, s, s′ ∈ N[x]
be given. Here n denotes the number of intended users and a and b the users to be protected from the others.
L(k) bounds the message length and s(k), s′(k) bound the number of messages each user can send and receive
respectively for a security parameter k.6 Then
Sys1 := {(Mˆ
filter, S filter)}
with Mˆ filter = {Mfiltera ,Mfilterb } and S filter
c
:= {outfilu ?, in
fil
u !, in
fil
u
⊳
!, inu?, outu !, outu
⊳! | u ∈ {a, b}}. We only
define the machine Mfiltera ; we obtain Mfilterb by exchanging the variables a and b.
Ports of a filter. The ports of machine Mfiltera are {infila ?, outfila !, outfila ⊳!} ∪ {outa?, ina !, ina⊳!} ∪
{pMb?, pMa !, pMa
⊳!}.
6 These bounds ensure that Sys
1
is polynomial-time. This is essential for applying the composition theorem to replace Sys ′
0
with Sys
0
in the overall system.
States of a filter. Mfiltera maintains a counter sa ∈ {0, . . . , s(k)} and an array (s′a,u)u∈M over {0, . . . , s′(k)}
counting the messages that a sends and receives from u, respectively. Further, it contains a variable stoppeda ∈
{0, 1} denoting whether the lower-layer service to a has stopped. All variables are initialized with 0 everywhere.
Filter transitions. The state-transition function of Mfiltera is defined by the following rules:
– Send initialization: On input (snd init) at infila ?: If sa < s(k), set sa := sa + 1, else stop.7
If stoppeda = 0, output (snd init) at ina ! and 1 at ina⊳!. Else output (rec init, a) at pMa ! and 1 at pMa ⊳!, i.e.,
use the special reliable channel.
– Receive initialization: On input (rec init, u) at outa? with u ∈ M: If s′a,u < s′(k), set s′a,u := s′a,u + 1,
else stop. If stoppeda = 0 and u = b (this is the filtering), output (rec init, b) at outfila ! and 1 at outfila
⊳
!.
– Receive initialization, extra channel: On input (rec init, b) at pMb?, output (rec init, b) at outfila ! and 1 at
outfila
⊳
!.
– Send: On input (send,m, v) at infila ? with m ∈ Σ+ and len(m) ≤ L(k), where len(m) denotes the message
length: If sa < s(k), set sa := sa + 1, else stop. If stoppeda = 0, output (send,m, v) at ina ! and 1 at ina⊳!.
If stoppeda = 0 and v = b, output (receive, a,m) at pMa ! and 1 at pMa ⊳!.
– Receive: On input (receive, u,m) at outa? with u ∈ M: If s′a,u < s′(k), set s′a,u := s′a,u + 1, else stop. If
u = b, output (receive, b,m) at outfila ! and 1 at outfila
⊳
!.
– Receive, extra channel: On input (receive, b,m) at pMb?, output (receive, b,m) at outfila ! and 1 at outfila
⊳
!.
– Stop: On input (stop) at outa?: If sa < s(k), set sa := sa + 1, else stop. If stoppeda = 0, set stoppeda := 1
and output (stop) at pMa ! and 1 at pMa ⊳!. (This ensures that machine Mfilterb also uses the special channel from
now on.)
– Stop, extra channel: On input (stop) at pMb?: Set stoppeda := 1. ⊓⊔
Remark 1. The filtering system Sys1 can easily be modified to an arbitrary set of protected users instead of
L = {a, b}. Moreover we can treat multiple disjoint sets of users where each user can communicate with other
users of its own set without outside interference.
Lemma 1. The system Sys1 is polynomial-time.
Proof. The machine Mfiltera has counters sa and s′a,u for each u ∈ {1, . . . , n}. At least one counter is increased
whenever Mfiltera receives an input at port infila ? or outa?, and once a counter reaches a polynomial bound s(k)
or s′(k), the machine stops. Every output at pMa ! is a direct consequence of an input at infila ? or outa? by con-
struction of Mfiltera . Hence the number of messages sent over pMa ! is at most s(k) + n · s′(k). This holds anal-
ogously for the machine Mfilterb . Thus the steps of the whole system Sys1 (not counting buffers) are bounded
by 4nmax{s(k), s′(k)}. Since each transition can clearly be realized in polynomial time, we conclude that the
collection {Mfiltera ,Mfilterb } is polynomial-time.
5.5 The Real Lower Layer: Secure and Reliable Message Transmission
In the real firewall system, the ideal system for secure reliable message transmission is replaced with its concrete
implementation Sys0. We only need a brief description of the original concrete implementation Sys0,orig here to
show how we modify it to include reliable channels, and to sketch a proof why this modified real system Sys0
is as secure as the modified ideal system Sys ′0 from Section 5.3. Otherwise, the benefit of the modular approach
enabled by the composition theorem is exactly that the higher-layer systems work with all correct implementations
of lower-layer systems.
The original system Sys0,orig, described in detail in [9], is a standard cryptographic system Sys0 =
{(MˆH, SH) | H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}} with the same access structure, specified ports, and in- and output types at the
specified ports as in the ideal system Sys ′0.
It uses asymmetric encryption and digital signatures, which must fulfill the accepted cryptographic definition,
i.e., security against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack for encryption and security against existential forgery under
adaptive chosen-message attacks for digital signatures [28, 46]. Efficient cryptographic primitives exist for both
cases under reasonable assumptions, e.g., [33, 46].
7 This means that this machine stops forever. It has nothing to do with the variable stoppeda .
On input of the command (snd init), a machine Mu creates signature and encryption keys and sends it to
the other machines Mv over authenticated channels. On input (send,m, v), machine Mu signs and encrypts the
message m with certain additional parameters and sends it to Mv over an insecure channel, representing a real
network. If Mv obtains such a message with correct syntax and the next expected message number, it outputs
(receive, u,m) to user v. The adversary schedules the communication between correct machines; otherwise its
capabilities arise from what machines and channels it has replaced in the actual structures according to the trust
model.
We now describe the modification to this system by reliable channels. Formally, reliable channels are a new
type in the channel model of standard cryptographic system, see Section 5.2.
Definition 17. (Reliable, Non-authenticated Channels) Let an intended structure (Mˆ , S ) with Mˆ := {Mu | u ∈
H} be given, and a channel defined by ports p!, p⊳! ∈ ports(Mu) and p? ∈ ports(Mv). If the channel model χ
classifies this channel as reliable non-authenticated, then in the derivation of the actual structure (MˆH, SH) for
an index set H, the channel is modified as follows: If only one of u, v lies in H, it is treated like an authenticated
channel. If u, v ∈ H, then a specific, buffer-style machine is inserted as shown in Figure 9.
– Mu,H gets a new port pd!, where it duplicates outputs made at p!. (As pd! is free, the adversary can connect to
it.)
– The input port p? of Mv,H is renamed into prout?.
– A machine pˇ is defined as follows: Its ports are {p?, prin?, prout!, prout
⊳!}. Given an input at p? or prin?, it forwards
this input to prout! and schedules it by outputting 1 at prout⊳!.
M
u,H
M
v,H
p A
pd
prout
p
prin
M
v
M
u
p
Fig. 9. Modeling Reliable, Non-Authenticated Channels
We assume without loss of generality that there is a systematic naming scheme for such new ports (e.g., appending
d
,
r
out,
r
in) that does not clash with prior names. Reliable, authenticated channels are defined similarly, simply by
omitting the port prin? of pˇ.
Now the modified system Sys0 is derived from the original one Sys0,orig by classifying the initialization chan-
nels between the machines Ma and Mb of Sys0,orig as reliable and authenticated, whereas the network channels
between these machines are classified as reliable, but non-authenticated.
In the following, we only briefly sketch that the relation “at least as secure as” still holds for the modified
system Sys0 and Sys ′0, because we would have to redo the whole original proof of [74] with only small changes.
Theorem 2. Let Sys0 and Sys ′0 be the modified real and ideal systems for reliable secure message transmission
as introduced in the previous sections. Then Sys0 ≥
f
poly Sys
′
0 with the mapping f defined as in [74].
Proof (sketch). Both the ideal and the real system Sys0 and Sys ′0 have been changed for initialization and sending
of messages. We now briefly sketch that these changes are consistent for both systems.
In case of initialization, the only difference between the original and the modified ideal system is that initializa-
tion between a and b is done immediately by THH, so the adversary is not able to initialize a connection between
these two honest users by himself because initialization commands are filtered out by construction of THH. In
the real system Sys0, this implicit initialization of THH exactly corresponds to a reliable authenticated channel
between a and b. In both systems, an initialization message is output to the user and immediately scheduled, along
with the usual output to the adversary. This gives consistent changes from Sys ′0,orig and Sys0,orig to Sys ′0 and Sys0,
respectively, which yields indistinguishable behaviors of Sys ′0 and Sys0 since Sys ′0,orig ≥ Sys0,orig has already
been shown in [74, 9].
In case of sending of messages, the difference to the original ideal scheme only affects sending messages
between the two distinguished low users. In this case THH immediately schedules the message to the correspond-
ing user and outputs a message of the form (send blindly, i, l, v) to the adversary. In the real system, reliable
non-authenticated channels do exactly the same: they schedule the message to the corresponding user and send
a blinded copy to the adversary. Hence we have consistent changes and, using Sys ′0,orig ≥ Sys0,orig, we obtain
indistinguishable behaviors.
5.6 Non-Interference Proof
We now show that the overall firewall system fulfills the flow policy sketched in Figure 6. First we formally define
the ideal and real composed firewall systems. Next we formalize the flow policy. We then prove that the ideal
firewall (consisting of the filtering system and the ideal secure message-transmission system) fulfills the flow
policy. With the composition theorem and the non-interference preservation theorem, we finally obtain the result
for the real firewall.
The ports of the lower- and higher-layer systems were named so that a composition of Sys ′0 and Sys1 connects
the structures in the desired way according to Figure 8. Thus we get a natural composition by composing every
structure of Sys ′0 with the only structure of Sys1. We only restrict Sys
′
0 to the structures where the two protected
users a and b are honest.
Definition 18. (Ideal Firewall System) Let Sys ′0,a,b := {({THH}, SH) ∈ Sys ′0 | {a, b} ⊆ H }. Then the ideal
firewall system is defined as
Sys∗ = {(Mˆ ∗H, S
∗
H) | {a, b} ⊆ H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}
with Mˆ ∗H := {THH,Mfiltera ,Mfilterb } and S ∗H
c := {outfilu ?, in
fil
u !, in
fil
u
⊳
! | u ∈ {a, b}} ∪ {outu?, inu !, inu
⊳! | u ∈
{1, . . . , n} \ {a, b}}.
The definition for the real firewall system is analogous:
Definition 19. (Real Firewall System) Let Sys0,a,b := {(MˆH, SH) ∈ Sys0 | {a, b} ⊆ H }. Then the real firewall
system is defined as
Sys# = {(Mˆ#H , S
∗
H) | {a, b} ⊆ H ⊆ {1, . . . , n}}
with S ∗H as in the ideal firewall system and Mˆ
#
H := MˆH ∪ {M
filter
a ,M
filter
b }.
These compositions fulfill the preconditions of the composition theorem from [74].
Given the composition, we can formally present the flow policy for the ideal firewall system Sys∗; recall
Figure 6.
Definition 20. (Flow Policy of the Firewall) We define a flow policy F∗ for Sys∗ as follows: For all (Mˆ ∗H, S ∗H) ∈
Sys∗, let F∗S∗
H
:= (∆S∗
H
,❀S∗
H
) with the index set IS∗
H
:= H be defined as follows: For u ∈ {a, b}, let S cu :=
{outfilu ?, in
fil
u !, in
fil
u
⊳
!}, and for u 6∈ {a, b}, let S cu := {outu?, inu !, inu⊳!}. We define Su 6❀S∗H Sv iff v ∈ {a, b} and
u 6∈ {a, b}.
We can now prove that the ideal firewall system fulfills its flow policy.
Theorem 3. (Non-Interference Property of the Ideal Firewall) Let F∗ be the flow policy of Definition 20. Then
the system Sys∗ fulfills F∗ perfectly.
In the proof of Theorem 3, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let (Mˆ ∗H, S ∗H) ∈ Sys
∗ arbitrary, and let F∗S∗
H
:= (∆S∗
H
,❀S∗
H
) be the flow policy of Definition 20
for this structure. Then the following invariants hold for all possible runs of all non-interference configurations
conf ∈ Confn in∆S∗
H
,H,L(Mˆ
∗
H, S
∗
H) for H ∈ H \ {a, b} and L ∈ {a, b}.
1. If Ha receives an input at outfila ?, it is of the form (rec init, b) or (receive, b,m) with m ∈ Σ+. If Ha receives
an input at mastera?, it is sent by the master scheduler and equals 1.
2. No output of Xn in at mastera ! depends on inputs from other machines. Each machine is clocked equally
often by Xn in using a rotating clocking scheme. Furthermore, each output at a port p⊳! for p⊳! ∈ S ca and the
scheduled message only depends on prior outputs of Ha at port ps! and p!.
3. If Ha receives a term of the form (rec init, b) at outfila ?, it is a direct consequence of the input
(snd init) sent by Hb (i.e., the scheduling sequence must have been Hb,Xn in,Mfilterb ,THH,Mfiltera ,Ha or
Hb,X
n in,Mfilterb ,M
filter
a ,Ha).
4. If Ha receives a term of the form (receive, b,m) at outfila ?, it is a direct consequence (in the sense of Part 3) of
the message (send, a,m) sent by Hb, so the scheduling sequence has been Hb,Xn in,Mfilterb ,THH,Mfiltera ,Ha
or Hb,X
n in,Mfilterb ,M
filter
a ,Ha.
The invariants also hold if we exchange the variables a and b.
Part 3 means that the adversary cannot initialize the communication between Ha and Hb. Part 4 ensures that
the adversary cannot pretend to be user Hb, and that the number of received messages from Hb equals the number
of messages sent by Hb.
Proof. Part 1 follows by construction of Mfiltera and Xn in. In the initialization transition the only possible output
at outfila ! is of the form (rec init, v). The test v = b of Mfiltera ensures that it is (rec init, b). The only remaining step
in which Mfiltera may output something to Ha is the receive-message step. Outputs are of the form (receive, u,m).
Again, Mfiltera checks u = b first so we can only have outputs of the form (receive, b,m). Thus, every output at
port outfila ! has the desired form. The port mastera? is connected to the master scheduler, and outputs there are of
the form 1 by definition of the master scheduler Xn in.
Part 2 is proved by inspection of the definition of Xn in. At the start of the run, Xn in schedules BITH and switches
between “Case 2: Schedule users” and “Case 3: Handle scheduling demands”, cf. Definition 10, afterwards. In
case 2, only the internal counter is checked and maybe the counter steps of Definition 10 is increased, so no
outputs from outside are taken into account. Now assume that Xn in outputs anything at p⊳! for p⊳! ∈ S ca . This can
only happen in case 3 if Xn in receives exactly one input at one of the ports ps? for ps! ∈ ports(Ha). In this case
it schedules the unique output port p⊳!. Because of p! ∈ ports(Ha) only messages sent by Ha are scheduled. This
finishes this sub-part of the proof.
Furthermore, note that no honest user can perform a clocked self-loop by definition. Moreover, the control will
automatically come back to Xn in after an arbitrary user is clocked by the system because users are forbidden to
have any clock-out ports by definition. If the adversary is scheduled it either has to do nothing or it has to schedule
a machine of the system. In the first case the control immediately goes to the master scheduler, in the second one
the machine of the system will either output nothing if one of its internal tests fails, or it finally schedules one
of the honest users. In both cases Xn in is clocked again. This ensures that the master scheduler will always be
scheduled after a constant number of steps. Hence it can indeed perform its round-robin clocking scheme, which
clocks every machine equally often.
Part 3 holds by construction of Mfiltera and THH and the previous part. First note that Ha can only receive a term
(rec init, b) if it has been output by THH at outa ! or by Mfilterb at pMb ! in the previous step. The second case
fulfills our requirements by construction of Mfilterb , because a message (snd init) must have been output by Hb and
scheduled by Xn in, so we can turn our attention to the first case. There are only two cases in which THH may have
output this term. The first case is initialization of user Hb, the second case is “Receive initialization”. In the first
case Hb outputs (snd init), the master scheduler Xn in schedules it (if Hb tells him what port to schedule, otherwise
nothing is scheduled), and THH directly outputs this term to Mfiltera and schedules it immediately. This fulfills our
requirements. We will now show that THH does not output anything in the other case.
On input (rec init, b) at port from adva?, THH first checks stopped speca = 0, doing nothing at failure. After
a successful test it checks init specb,a = 0. By our modification of THH this can only hold if Hb has not initialized
itself, so init specb,b = 0 must hold. Because of b ∈ H, THH will not outputs anything. This finishes the proof of this
part.
Part 4 is proved similar to the previous part. First note that Ha can only receive a term (receive, b,m) if it has been
output by THH at outa ! or by Mfilterb at pMb ! in the previous step. An input by Mfilterb fulfills our requirements by
construction of Mfilterb . Note that there are only two cases in which THH may have output this term. The first case
is sending messages of user Hb to user Ha, the second case is “Receive messages from user b”. In the first case, Hb
sends (send,m, a), which is again scheduled by Xn in. THH directly outputs this term to Mfiltera and schedules it
immediately. This fulfills our requirements. Furthermore, it increases the internal counter msg out specb,a . We finally
show that THH does not output anything in the second case. On input (receive blindly, b, i) at port from adva?,
THH first does its usual initialization checks. We assume them to be successful, otherwise it outputs nothing any-
way. It then checks msg out specb,a = j, if (m, j) := deliver
spec
b,a [i] 6= ↓. However, the message counter msg out
spec
b,a
is set to msg in specb,a + 1 after every sent message from b to a and j ≤ msg in
spec
b,a always holds by construction of
THH for every (m, j) := deliver specb,a [i] 6= ↓. Hence, we have j < msg out
spec
b,a and THH will not output anything.
This finishes the proof of this part.
Proof (Theorem 3). We have to show that Sys∗ fulfills the flow policy F∗. Let a structure (Mˆ ∗H, S ∗H) ∈ Sys∗ be
given, and F∗S∗
H
:= (∆S∗
H
,❀S∗
H
) the flow policy for this structure. Let two port sets Su 6❀ Sv be given. Because
of the symmetry of the flow policy, we can assume v = a, while u 6∈ {a, b}. We have to show (MˆH, SH) |=perf
NIReqF∗
S∗
H
,u,v.
Let a non-interference configuration conf = (MˆH, S ,U n in,AH) for this structure and high and low user
u and v be given. We denote the two families of views of Ha for the initial bit b by view conf ,b(Ha), and as-
sume a fixed security parameter k. Assume for contradiction that Pguess,conf is greater than 12 . This implies
view conf ,0({Ha,Hb}) 6= view conf ,1({Ha,Hb}). This means that there has to be a first input to {Ha,Hb} with
different probability in both cases. We use Lemma 2 to show that this cannot happen.
By Part 1 of Lemma 2, this input can only be of the form (rec init, c) or (receive, c,m) at outfilc ?, or 1 at
masterc? for c ∈ {a, b}. We write c¯ for the other protected user, i.e., {c, c¯} = {a, b}. If the input is (rec init, c)
Part 3 implies that this input is a direct consequence of an input (snd init) by user Hc¯. Hence, there had to be an
input to Hc¯ with different probability in both cases. This contradicts our assumption of the first different input.
Now assume this first different input is of the form (receive, c,m). By Part 4 the corresponding input
(send, c¯,m) must have been sent directly by Hc with the same message m. Furthermore, the underlying trusted
host THH for secure reliable message transmission ensures that the message has been sent exactly as often as
Hc¯ receives this input, so there cannot be any influence from outside for the same reason as in the first case.
This implies that there already had to be an input to Hc with different probability in both cases, contradicting our
assumption of the first different input again.
Finally, assume this input is at port masterc?. By Part 2 this input does not depend on any behaviors of other
machines. Analogous to the previous cases, we obtain a contradiction again.
Therefore, we obtain Pguess,conf = 12 . This finishes the proof for conf , and thus the overall proof.
Given that the ideal firewall fulfills its flow policy it follows easily that the real firewall fulfills the corresponding
flow policy. However, this only holds computationally because the real firewall is only computationally as secure
as the ideal one.
Theorem 4. (Non-Interference Property of the Real Firewall) The real system Sys# for the cryptographic firewall
fulfills the flow policy F# computationally, where F# is the corresponding flow policy for F∗ according to
Definition 16. In formulas, Sys# |=poly F#.
Proof. According to Theorem 2, the real secure reliable message-transmission system Sys0 is computationally
at least as secure as its specification Sys ′0. By Part 1 of Lemma 2 the system Sys1 is polynomial-time. The
other, more technical preconditions for the composition theorem can easily be seen to be fulfilled. Hence we have
Sys# ≥poly Sys
∗
. Since perfect fulfillment of non-interference requirements implies computational fulfillment,
we obtain Sys# |=poly F# using Theorem 1.
6 Conclusion
We have presented the first general definition of probabilistic non-interference in reactive systems that includes
a computational case (Section 3). We have established a preservation theorem stating that our definition behaves
well under simulatability (Section 4); this enables modular proofs of cryptographic systems and step-wise refine-
ment without destroying the non-interference properties. This is particularly important because non-interference
properties of abstract specifications of cryptographic systems can often be validated by formal proof tools, whereas
real cryptographic systems are much more difficult to validate. As an example, we have presented a cryptographic
firewall system and proved a non-interference property via the preservation theorem (Section 5).
Actually using formal proof tools for similar proofs is one possibility for future research. Furthermore, we only
considered transitive flow policies so far. However, there are several interesting examples of intransitive flow poli-
cies, and several definitions were made for deterministic and non-deterministic system models [77, 75, 76, 80, 59].
We extended these notions to probabilistic and computational models in [12], and obtained first quantative com-
putational results in [4]. Another possible direction is to consider different master schedulers in non-interference
configurations and to study to what extent the resulting semantics depends on the scheduling strategy. Finally, the
preservation theorem paves the way towards treating cryptographic primitives similar to the Dolev-Yao abstrac-
tion again, as in some articles mentioned in the introduction. A first suitable, composable library of cryptographic
primitives with a simulatability proof between the ideal and the real version was presented in [19, 18, 14, 24]. This
may eventually lead again to a type-based analysis of larger systems that only use well-defined cryptographic
primitives as black boxes. Note, however, that the computational non-interference definition and the preservation
theorem were necessary to put such an approach on a sound basis.
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A Ideal Secure Message Transmission with Reliable Channels
This appendix contains the full definition of the ideal lower layer of the firewall system, the secure message-
transmission system with reliable channels, as sketched in Section 5.3.
Scheme 2 (Secure, Reliable Message Transmission with Ordered Channels) Let n ∈ N and polynomials
L, s1, s2 ∈ N[x] be given that bound the length of each message and the number of messages a user can send
and receive, respectively, from another user. Let M := {1, . . . , n}, and fix two elements a, b ∈M.
The system is a standard ideal system (see Section 5.3) with the access structure ACC := {H ⊆ M | a, b ∈
H}. Thus it is of the form
Sys ′0 = {({THH}, SH) | H ∈ ACC}.
Specified ports. We define the specified ports by their complements, i.e., the ports the honest users should have:
S cH := {inu !, outu?, inu
⊳! | u ∈ H}.
Ports of the trusted hosts. The ports of THH are {inu?, outu !, outu⊳! | u ∈ H} ∪ {from advu?,
to advu !, to advu
⊳! | u ∈ H}.
State of the trusted hosts. Internally, THH maintains seven arrays:
– (init specu,v )u,v∈M over {0, 1}models the initialization state of the users,
– (stopped specu )u∈H over {0, 1} denotes whether the service to user u has stopped,
– (sc in,specu,v )u∈H,v∈M over {0, . . . , s1(k)} counts the inputs of user u intended for user v,
– (scout,specu,v )u∈M,v∈H over {0, . . . , s2(k)} counts the outputs for user v originating from user u,
– (msg in specu,v )u∈H,v∈M over {0, . . . , s1(k)} counts the valid sent messages from user u to user v,
– (msg out specu,v )u,v∈H over {0, . . . , s2(k)} denotes the next message number expected from u at v, and
– (deliver specu,v )u,v∈H over lists holds the messages in transit from u to v.
The first five arrays are initialized with 0 everywhere, the sixth one with 1 everywhere, and the lists in the seventh
are initially empty.
Transition function. The state-transition function of THH is defined by the following rules for the individual
inputs. Σ denotes the message alphabet, len(m) the length of a message and size(l) the length of a list. The value
↓ denotes an error. “Abort” means finishing a state transition.
We give explanations in the first transition; the other transitions should then be understood similarly.
– Send initialization: On input (snd init) at inu?: If sc in,specu,v < s1(k) for all v ∈ M, set sc in,specu,v := sc in,specu,v +1
for all v ∈ M, otherwise abort. This ensures that the number of inputs remains polynomial. Verify
stopped specu = 0 and init specu,u = 0, i.e., the service for user u is still alive and u has not initialized before. If
not, abort. Set init specu,u := 1 and output (snd init) at to advu !, i.e., the adversary learns of the initialization.
If u = a, immediately set init speca,b = 1 because for this user pair we model reliable communication, and output
(rec init, a) at outb ! and 1 at outb⊳!, and similarly with a and b exchanged. Otherwise output 1 at to advu⊳!.
– Receive initialization: On input (rec init, u) at from advv? with u ∈ M, v ∈ H: If stopped specv = 0,
init specu,v = 0, and [u ∈ H ⇒ init specu,u = 1], set init specu,v := 1, else abort. If scout,specu,v < s2(k) set scout,specu,v :=
scout,specu,v + 1 and output (rec init, u) at outv ! and 1 at outv⊳!.
– Send: On input (send,m, v) at inu?: If sc in,specu,v < s1(k), set sc in,specu,v := sc in,specu,v +1, otherwise abort. Verify
that stopped specu = 0, m ∈ Σ+, l := len(m) ≤ L(k), v ∈M\{u}, init specu,u = 1 and init specv,u = 1, else abort.
Set msg in specu,v := msg inspecu,v + 1.
• If v 6∈ H, output (send, (m,msg in specu,v ), v) at to advu ! and 1 at to advu
⊳!.
• If v ∈ H, set i := size(deliver specu,v ) + 1 and deliver
spec
u,v [i] := (m,msg in
spec
u,v ). Further, output
(send blindly, i, l, v) at to advu !.
∗ If {u, v} 6= {a, b}, output 1 at to advu⊳!.
∗ If {u, v} = {a, b} set msg out specu,v := msg inspecu,v + 1 and output (receive, u,m) at outv ! and 1 at
outv
⊳!.8
– Receive from honest party u: On input (receive blindly, u, i) at from advv? with u, v ∈ H: Verify that
stopped specv = 0, init
spec
v,v = 1, init
spec
u,v = 1, sc
out,spec
u,v < s2(k) and (m, j) := deliver
spec
u,v [i] 6= ↓, else abort.
Further verify msg out specu,v = j. If this holds set scout,specu,v := scout,specu,v + 1 and msg out specu,v := j + 1 and
output (receive, u,m) at outv ! and 1 at outv⊳!.
– Receive from dishonest party u: On input (receive, u,m) at from advv? with u ∈ M \ H,m ∈
Σ+, len(m) ≤ L(k) and v ∈ H: If stopped specv = 0, init specv,v = 1, init specu,v = 1 and scout,specu,v < s2(k),
set scout,specu,v := sc
out,spec
u,v + 1 and output (receive, u,m) at outv ! and 1 at outv⊳!.
– Stop: On input (stop) at from advu? with u ∈ H: If stopped specu = 0, set stopped specu := 1 and output (stop)
at outu ! and 1 at outu⊳!.
8 Increasing the out-message counter is essential for avoiding replay attacks because the message m is directly delivered to v
using a reliable channel.
